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AGEXcY-DUTY OWED To TRFsPAssER.-Defendant's servant, a truck
driver, while making deliveries, invited the plaintiff to ride with him. When
the driver attempted to turn into an intersecting street at forty miles an
hour, the plaintiff was thrown from the truck and injured. The plaintiff's
suit was based on alleged wanton, wilful and reckless conduct of the defendant's servant. Held: Judgment for defendant. O'Learv t,. Fash, 140
N. E. 282 (Mass. 1923).
The general rule is that one whom. a servant invites on his master's
property without authority, is a trespasser. Collins v. Chicago, 187 111. App.
30 (1914) ; Kalmich v. White, 95 Conn. 568. 111 Atl. 845 (192o). The master
through his servant, is then bound to refrain from wilful, wanton and reckless nisconduct toward the intruder. Evarts v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 56 Minn.
541, 57 N. W. 459 (1894); Stipetich v. Security Stove Co., 218 S. W. 964
(Mo. App. 1920); Higbee v. Jackson, ioi Ohio St. 75, 128 N. E. 6i (1920).
An able discussion of the question is contained in the majority and dissenting opinions in Higbee v. Jackson, supra. See Shearman and Redfield,
Negligence (6th Ed. 1913), 159.

This rule appears to well settled in Pennsylvania.

Petrowski v. Phil-

adelphlia & Reading R. R., 263 Pa. 531, 1o7 Atd. 381 (i919) ; Lafferty v.
Armour & Co., 272 Pa. 588, u6 Aft. 515 (1922); Nelson v. Johnstown Traction Co.. 276 Pa. 178, 1 9 Atl. 918 (1923).

The Massachusetts court seems to have uniformly protected trespassers
on realty against wilful, wanton and reckless misconduct of the owner and
his servants. Romana v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 218 Mass. 76, ioS N. .
598 (1914); Adamowicz v. Newburyport Gas Co., 238 Mass. 244, 13o N. I.
388 (i92i). The principal case, however, expressly refuses a similar right
to a trespasser on personal property. In so doing; it offers no basis for the
distinction; and until some such basis is proposed, it is submitted that the
rule in the principal case is arbitrary.
Biu. or LADx-,--INNoc XT HOLDER-CARRIERS' LIAB3LITY FOR MISDA'INC.

-The plaintiff, a grain dealer, purchased wheat to be delivered via the defendant carrier. His vendor presented interstate bills of lading duly signed
by the agent of the defendant company, and received the purchase price of
the wheat. In the meantime the plaintiff had negotiated a re-sale of the
wheat, but the contract was later rescinded by his vendee, on the ground that
the goods had not been shipped on the bill of lading date. The plaintiff sold
at a loss and claims damages resulting from the defendant's negligence in
misdating the bill. Held: (Johnston, C. J. Harvy, J., and Hopkins, I., dissenting) : The bona fide holder of a bill of lading cannot recover for ship
per's negligence in dating same. Brown v. Uniont Pacific R. Co., 216 Pac. 299
(Kan. 1923).

The Federal Bill of Lading Act which governs cases of this kind, and
uilon which the plaintiff relies for recovery, expressly provides that. when a
carrier has issued an order bill, it shall be liable thereon to the innocent
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holder, who has given value -rdying upon the description . . . of the
goods, for damages caused by . . . their failure to correspond with the
description thereof in the hill at the time of its issue." Bill of Lading Act,
39 Stat. at L. 538 (1916).
The case evolves itself into a very interesting and hitherto undecided
question of fact, viz.: is the date of shipment part of the dcscription of the
consignment'
The dissenting justices answered this in the affirmative, holding that the principal object in the passage of the act was to make such bills
negotiable in order to afford every protection to the innocent holder, They
further contended that the date may he and is in fact sometimes a vital part
of the description. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurlstone & Coltman, 9o6
(Eng. 1864), (a leading case on importance of shipping date in ascertaining
subject matter of contract). The majority of the court contended that -a
description of a carload of goods only includes a recital of their character,
of their sort, kind, or species.
It is submitted that the uncertainty of the statute which permits of such
ambiguous interpretations is lamentable since the courts can, in the absence of
statutory or former judicial definitions, do little more than make an educated
guess as to the legislative intent.

CAaRnms-DtrY To INTOxICATEn P.ssaxci.-Plaintiff's husband when
intoxicated received fatal injuries in a fall from a street car platform. Held:
A higher degree of care than to ordinary passengers wvas owed where the
conductor knew or ought to have known of the condition of the deceased.
Jamcitis, Appellant, -.. Wilkes-Barre Ript'. Co.. 277 Pa. 437, 121 Atl. 317
(1923).

There seems to be no unanimity among the courts with regard to the
duty of a carrier to an intoxicated passenger. Starting 'with the principle of"utmost caution characteristic of very prudent men"; Meier v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 64 Pa. 225 (187o); Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451
(88o),
the courts have uniformly held. that when a person known to be
mentally or physically disabled is accepted as a passenger, a degree of care
is owed commensurate with the circumstances; this has been the decision
in the case of an infant. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 125 Miss. 336,
88 So. i (i92!); sick or infirm, Steketee v. Waters. e at., 193 Mich. 177,
i59 N. W. 368 (igi6); insane, Chicago R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Sears, 210 S.
W. 684 (Tex. i919). This additional burden of care imposed is offset by
permitting the carrier to refuse as a passenger any of this class without an
attendant Connors v. Cunard Co., -o4 Mass. 310. go N. F_ 6or (i9io).
The carrier may also refuse an intoxicated person. Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 3po (1874): Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Gatewood. 155 Ky. io2. I59 S. W. 66o (1913): Parks v. D. L. & W. R. R.
Co.. 8s N. J. L 577. 89 AtI. 983 (1914).
Where disability is voluntary through intoxication. although the courts
hesitated to impose a greater degree of care, the weight of authority enforces this duty of additional precaution. Donovan v. Greenfield and J. F.
St. Rwy. Co., 183 Fed. 526, io6 C. C. A. 72 (1g91); Warren v. Pittsburgh &

70

LAW REVIEW

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Butler Rwy. Co., 243 Pa. iS, 89 Atl. 828 (1914); Fagan v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. Co., 220 N. Y. 301, 1 i N. E. 704 (x917). In conflict is the rule
that an intoxicated man is to be judged by the same standard as a sober
man. Fisher v. West Virginia & Pittsburg R. R. Co., 42 W. Va. 183, 24 S.
E. 57o (i896) ; Johnson v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 104 Ala. 241 (I803) ;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Payne, 104 S. W. 752 (Ky. 19o7). Ingerson v. Grand
Trunk Rwy., 79 N. H. 154, 1o6 Atl. 488 (1919),

requires that the carrier

must know of the incapacity, not merely ought to have known. A Texas
case varies the degree of care with the degree of intoxication. Paris & G.
N. Ry. Co. v. Robinson ct al., 53 Tex. Civ. App. 12, 114 S. V. 658 (i9o8).
Since intoxication is not negligence as a matter of law; Holmes v. The Or.
& Cal. Rwy. Co., 5 Fed. 523, 6 Sawyer 262 (188o); Kingston v. Ft. Wayne
& E. Ry. Co., 112 Mich. 40, 7o N. W. 315 (1897); Houston T. & C. R. v.
Bryant ct al., .31 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 72 S. W. 885 (193) ; those jurisdictions
which accept the last clear chance doctrine generally favor the plaintiff by
drawing the shadowy line between intoxication as a condition and a cause.
Black v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., 193 Mass. 448,
i9 N. E. 797 (i9o7); Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 70 N. H. 6o7, 5o At.
103 (igoI) ; Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., supra. One case holds
the question of contributory negligence cannot arise where the conductor knew
of the passenger's disability. Price et al. v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 75
Ark. 479, 88 S. W. 575 (1905). It is submitted that the principal case is
logically sound and socially beneficial, and that it represents the better vieW.
CITIZENSHIP--DUAL

CIrIZESHIP-BRITISH

CITIzE.:

LIABLE AS

GER-

2Ax NATxox.-The plaintiff, a British citizen by birth, became a German

citizen by operation of German law. He never divested himself of British
citizenship. An order in Council, of statutory force, Treaty of Peace Order,
19i9, carrying out Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles, subjected property
of "German nationals" in England to certain charges. Plaintiff sought to
have his English property freed from these charges. Held: The property
was subject to the charges. Kramer v. The Attorney-General, 129 Law
Times R. 39o (House of Lords, 1923).

In both the Treaty and the Order in Council. the term "national," as
applied to individuals, is equivalent to citizen. Plaintiff is admittedly a
British citizen, and as such claimed to be outside the terms of the Order.
The Order, not the Treaty, is the basis of the decision.
Formerly a citizen of Great Britain could not expatriate himself without
the consent of his sovereign. Men of English birth who had lived most of
their lives abroad, were convicted of treason in England when captured in
an enemy's forces. Storie's Case, 3 Dyer 3oo b, 73 Reprint 675 (Eng. 1571) ;
MacDonald's Case, i8 How. St. Tr. 858 (Eng. 1747) ; 1 Blackstone Comm.
370. And, although expatriation is now allowed, Stat. 33-34 Vict. c. 14
(187o), until a citizen has expatriated himself in accordance with the statute,
prior to this time he has been considered in law to be a British citizen only.
If he was also a citizen of another country, that fact was ignored. Rex v.
Lynch, L. P- I K. B. 444 (Eng. 19o3); Rex v. Middlesex Regiment, er
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parte Freyberger, L. R. 2 K. B. i29 (Hug. 1917) ; likewise in the United States.
Ludlum v. Ludlum. 26 N. Y. 35p (1863) ; State v. Jackson. 79 Vt. 504, 65 Att.
637 (19o7) ; Hammerstein v. L ne, 2oo Fed. 165 (1912).
In the principal case.. however, an English court construes an English
law as declaring that a British citizen is also a German citizen, and deals
with him as a German.
ie is at once a citizen and an alien. If this principle is extended to cases that do not arise under this Order, it will be
interesting to note whether it will be applied where the obligations of a
citizen to the nation are sought to be enforced, or whether it will be reserved
ior cases such as the present one where a person claims protection from thenation on the basis of his citizenship.

CoxNLIcr OF LAws--A.NU.'%ExT OF .1nRRIAGF-.A female of fourteen
years went from Oklahoma into Arkansas and contracted a marriage legal
and binding under the laws of that state. The parties then returned to
Oklahoma, where both were domiciled. An Oklahoma statute prohibited
females under fifteen years from entering the marriage relation. Bill in
equity by the girl's grandfather, to annul the marriage. Held: Bill granted,
Ross -. Bryant, 217 Pac. 364 (Okla. 1923).
The general rule in this country is that a marriage -valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, even though it would have been invalid if telebrated in the domicile oT the parties. In re Chace. 26 R. I.351, 58 At. 978
(1904) ; State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403. 38 Atd. 81 (t897) ; Green v. McDowell,
242 S. IV. 168 (Mo. I922).
This rule is subject to the following exceptions:
(1) Where a marriage, contracted under foreign law is deemed generally in all the states to be contrary to the laws of nature, e. g.. marriage
between uncle and niece in Russia was held void in Pennsylvania; Devine v.

Rodgers, io9 Fed. 886 (1go1). A marriage between Indians of a tribe which
permitted polygamy held void in North Carolina. State v. Tachanatah, 64
X. C. 614 (187o).
(2)

Where a statute expressly states that a certain marriage is void

whether celebrated within or without the state. Sturgis v. Sturgis, St Ore.
1o, 93 Pae. 696 (9o8) ; State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (1890).
(3) Where it is considered that a particular statute expresses so dis.tinctive a public policy that it will be construed to have extra-territorial
force, although other states, differing in their concepts of morality, allow
such a marriage, c. g.. marriage between divorcee and his paramour in Maryland held void in Pennsylvania.

(1897).

In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 AtI. z6

Marriage between white man and Indian held void in Washington.

In re Wilbur, 8 Wash. 35, 35 Pac. 407 (1894).
Most courts properly endeavor to restrict the scope of this last excep-

tion, and will disregard, as immaterial, the intent to evade the law of the
domicile. Harding v. Allen. 9 Me. 140 (1832) ; Smith v. Smith, 52 N. J. L
27. i9 AtI. 255 (iftp). Generally statutes setting an age of consent are
not construed extra-territorially. Heller v. Heller. 28 Chicago Legal News.
288 (1896).
Perkey v. Perkey, 87 .W. Va. 656, io6 S. E. 40 (t921). The
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principal case would seem an unwarranted extension of the exception. If a
marriage is valid in one state it should be valid everywhere. Application
of such a restrictive doctrine in statutory construction. would tend to produce
uniformity in the law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPNDING POWER OF CoN.,ass-TnE MATERNITY
Acr.-The Sheppard-Towner Act of November 23, 192i, 42 Stat. at L. 224,
c. 135, appropriates a sum of money, to be allotted and paid to such states
as shall accept the provisions of the act, and co-operate with the states to
reduce maternal and infant mortality and protect the health of mothers and
infants. Two suits, one by a state, and one by an individual as a "taxpayer
of the United States," were brought to enjoin enforcement of the act. Hdd:
Dismissing both cases, that the court did not have jurisdiction. Massachusetts v. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, and Frothingham v. Same,
43 Sup. Ct. 597 (xg3).
The Frothingham case was dismissed on the ground that a taxpayer, as
such, has no standing to attack the constitutionality of a Congressional appropriation..
The interest of a taxpayer in municipal and state expenditures is generally held to be sufficiently direct to allow him to attack their constitutionality. Crampton v. Zabriskie, 1o U. S. 6o (1879) ; Roberts v. Bradfield,
12 D. C. App. 453 (1898); Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40
S. E. ioo4 (i9O2). Contra: Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 541 (1865); State
ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912). But the present
case holds that the effect of a Congressional appropriation on a taxpayer is
too remote and indirect to allow him to question its constitutionality. The
suit by Massachusetts, insofar as it claimed to be in behalf of its citizens,
was dismissed on the ground that a state may not intervene to protect its
citizens from acts of the Federal Government
The question involved in the merits of these cases as to the extent- of
the spending powers of Congress has never been passed on by the court,
although it was much debated by Presidents and statesmen of earlier days.
See 36 HARV. L. Rrv. 548. Appropriations for the Pacific Railroad and for
the Panama Canal, when attacked, were justified under the commerce, postal
and war powers. California v. Pacific R. R., 127 U. S. 1 (887); Wilson v.
Shaw, Secretary of the Treasury, 204 U. S. 24 (i9o7). But appropriations
made for relief of victims of catastrophes, and to promote education, agriculture and science, seem never to have been questioned.
The present decision, although purely on jurisdictional grounds, is important, as its practical effect may well be to make impossible attacks on
any appropriation of Congress. It is possible, however, that, if a case should
be presented of which the court would assume jurisdiction, a decision of
different effect would be rendered on the merits.

EQL'ITY-INJuCTioN-TRADE

NAMES

AND

UNFAIR

COMPETITIO,;.-The

plaintiff corporation or its predecessors had conducted a preparatory school
under the name of the "Columbia Grammar School." since 1864. Since x92r
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the defendant has been conducting a similar school in the* same city under
the name of the "Columbia Preparatory School."

The plaintiff sought an

injunction to restrain the defendant's use of "Columbia" in connection with
"school" on the ground of unfair competition. held: Injunction granted.
Columbia Grammar School v. Clauson, 2oo N. Y. S. ;68, 120 Misc. Rep. 841
(1923).
It is well settled law, that, where the plaintiff corporation has an exclusive right to its name, any simulation thereof will be enjoined. WVeinst'ck, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, io9 Cal. 529, 42 Pac. 142 (v&9) ; Atlas Assur.
Co. v. Atlas Ins. Co., 138 Iowa 228, 112 N. W. 232 (i9o7) ; Finney's Orchestra
v. Finney's Famous Orchestra, 161 Mich. 289, 126 N. W. 198 (igio). Istentional fraud need not be shown in such cases. Holmes v. Holmes, 37 Conn.
278 (187o). Elgin National Vatch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665
()o
; Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Manufacturing Co., 233 U. S. 461
(1914).
In the case of non-exclusive trade names, the courts have prescribed two
,.rounds for the granting of injunctions: (i) Mqhere there is an intent to get
an unfair and fraudulent share of another's business, the court will generally grant an injunction on the ground of unfair competition. Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Long, 8 App. Cas. 15, 52 L. J. Ch. 481 (Eng. 1882); American
Brewing Co. v. St. Louis Brewing Co., 47 Mo. App. 14 (1891); Buzby v.
(2) \\"here the effect of the
Davis, i5o Fed. 275; 8o C. C. A. 163 (igo6).
defendant's action is to produce confusion in the public mind and consequent
loss to the complainant, the tendency of the courts is to grant an injunction
irrespective of intent. Martell v. St. Francis Hotel Co., 51 Wash. 375, 98
Pac. 1116 (19o9); Hartzler v. Goshen Churn Ladder Co., 55 Ind. ApMx 455
(1914); German-American Button Co. v. A. Heymsfeld, Inc., x7o N. Y. App.
Div. 416, 156 N. Y. S. 223 (1915).
Some courts have carried the last principle even further and have
awarded an injunction because of the confusion created in the public mind
regardless of the damage. Bagby & Rivers Co. v. Rivers; 87 Md. 400, 40
Atl. 171 (1898); Y. W. C. A. Int. Com. v. Y. NV. C. A., t94 11. 194 (i92);
In Potter v. Osgood, 79
496, 8o N. E. 293 (1907).
People v. Rose, 225 Ill.
Pa. Super. 397 (1922), the court went so far as to grant an injunction td
restrain the defendant's use of a name resembling plaintiff's, solely on the
ground that great confusion in plaintiff's correspondence had resulted therefrom. See 71 U. OF PA. L. Ry. 175 (Jan. 1923).
In contrast to that decision, the court in Munn Co. v. American Co., 83"
X. J. Eq. 3o9, 91 Atl. 87 (1914), refused relief, holding .that the basis of
suits to enjoin the use of complainant's name should be the damage or possibility of damage to the individual complaining and not the damage or
probability of damage to 'the public. But that case may be distinguished
from the instant case in that the suit was not brought by the company whose
name was simulated by the defendant, but rather by a third company which
had conspired with the defendant to effect the original simulation.
It seems doubtful whether a modern court would reqt'ire proof of absolute damage to the complainant so long as it can be shown that a name so
similar to his has been adopted as to confuse the public.

74

UNIVERSIT1O

PENNSYLIPANIA LAW REVIEW

SLL-By sealed
Ertt;ITY-UNUSCLOSFD
PRINCI'AL---CoNTRA:T UxDa
instrument, the plaintiff's assignors agreed to sell, and one Begen agreed to
buy, a certain piece of land. Plaintiff sought specific performance on the
theory that the defendant was the undisclosed principal of Begen. Held:
Decree granted. Van Ingen v. Behnont, i21 N. Y. Misc. 1og, 200 N. Y. S.

847

(1923).

The inflexible rule of the common law was that an undisclosed principal
could not be held on a sealed instrument, since he was not a party to the
obligation. Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 374 (Mass. 185); Schaefer v.
Henkel, 75 N. Y. 378 (1878); Badger v. Drake, 31 C. C. A. 378, 88 Fed. 48
(i898). This has long been held in Pennsylvania. Quigley v. De Hass, 82
Pa. 267 (1876).
The principal case is an advanced step in the slow process of -breaking
down this rule. No case has been found where a court has taken the initiative in departing from the old rule; and even where the legislature has
shown the way, as in the -principal case, the judiciary has been slow to
follow.
In Texas, under a statute which in terms abolished the effect of a seal
(McEachin's Civ. Stat.. 1913, Art. 7092). it is held that nevertheless the
undisclosed principal is not bound. Sanger v. Warren, 9i Tex. 472, 44 S. W.
477 (1898). Several years later, however, under a similar provision in the
laws of Minnesota (Gen' Stat. 1913; sec. 5704), the courts of that state fol-

lowed the literal import of the act and permitted suit against an undisclosed
principal. Efta v. Swanson, ii5 Minn. 373, 132 N. V. 335 (1911).
However, under statutes which do not pretend to abolish the seal entirely, the process has been still more slow. In Michigan, after the legislature had declared the seal to be merely prcsumptive evidence of consideration (Comp. Laws 1871, sec. 5947), the common law principle as to a
suit against the undisclosed principal was held to have remained unchanged.
Ferris v. Snow. t24 Mich. 55g, 83 N. W. 374 (1900). The similar statute in
New York (Civ. Code 84o), was at first likewise interpreted. Stanton v.
Granger,

125

N. Y. App. Div. 174, 1o9 N. Y. S. 134 (igoS).

However, as

noted in 70 U. oF PA. L. RFV. 58. the strictness of this rule broke down
when, in Lagumis v. Gerard. 116 N. Y. Misc. 471, i9o N. Y. S. 207 (1921).
the undisclosed principal was permitted to sue on a contract under seal.
The next step was taken in Ressler v. Samphimor, 201 N. Y. App. Div. 344,
194 N. Y. S. 363 (1922), when an undisclosed principal was held. This case
was rendered almost valueless on this point because the decision was placed
primarily on the ground of obvious fraud on the part of the principal.
The principal case is stronger than Ressler v. Samphimor, sispra, because
there was no evidence of fraud; the court attaches weight to the fact that
no seal was here necessary, and that therefore it might be disregarded. The
statute is the element which makes the case depart from the common law
rule.
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EviDEncEADMISSIxLITY OF COPY OF STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE.-Tn an
action to recover damages for the negligence of the defendant in New; Jersey,
the Municipal Court of Philadelphia refused to admit as proof of the law of
New Jersey, a copy of a New Jersey statute, upon the ground that the only
way to prove the law of another state was by cafling a lawyer of that
jurisdiction to testify. Held: Error.
Co., 81 Pa. Sup. 195 (1923).

Boryk Bros., Inc.. s'. H'itso,-11drfiln

It is fundamental that the unwritten law of a foreign jnrisdictiol- may
be proved by parol, but a great diversity of judicial opinion has arisen' as to
the means of proving a foreign statute. The early English cases held that
all foreign statutes were provable by parol. Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridgw. Cas..
Temp. Hardw. 263 (Eng. 1744); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. i6i (-Eng.
1774). Although a few English cases of about the year i8oo required proof
by a copy; Harford v. Morris. 2 Hagg. Cons. 423 (Eng. i8oo); Millar v.
Heinrick, 4 Camp. 155 (Eng. i8t5); subsequent cases affirmed the view that
expert testimony was admissible to prove a foreign statute. Sussex Peerage
Case, xI Cl. & F. 85 (Eng. 1844); Baron de Bode's Case, 8 Q. B. 208 (Eng.
1845). Despite the precedent set by the English cases, many courts of the
new-born United States required either a copy of the statute with the great
seal of the state, a copy proved to be a true copy, or a copy certified by an
authorized official. Story, Conflict of Laws, § 641 (1883); Bailey -v. Mc)owell, 2 Harr. 34 (Del. 1835) ; Isabella v. Pecot, 2 La. An. 387 (1847).
Some states realizing that the mere language of a statute was insufficient to
give a true conception of the law and that a knowledge of the exposition,
interpretation and adjudication of the statute was necessary for its complete
understanding, passed statutes allowing parol evidence. Others by statute
only allowed parol evidence when accompanied by a copy of the statute to
be explained; and some states still do not allow parol evidence. For statutes
see Wigmore, Evidence, § 1271, Note 4 (1923).

Much to its credit, Pennsylvania as early as 1789 refused to be bound
by the narrow rules of admissibility adopted by many of her sister states
and began a course of judicial legislation which eventually accomplished
the result later achieved by statutory enactment in other states. Thompson
v. Musser, I Dallas 458 (Pa. i789), held that a copy of a Virginia statute
printed by a state printer was of sufficient authenticity to be admitted in evidence. This decision was followed in some jurisdictions and has been
broadened to admit statute books "purporting to be printed by authority."
Phillips v. Gregg, io Watts 158 (Pa. i84o); The Pawashick, 2 Low. 142
(D. C. 1872); Dawson v. Peterson, 1io Mich. 431, 68 N. W. 246 (i896).
But the Pennsylvania decisions have gone farther and now admit parol evidence of statute law when the peculiar circumstances of the case justify.
Phillips v. Gregg, io Watts i58 (Pa. 184o); Amer. Life Ins. & Trust Co.
v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 5o7 (1875). With these decisions in mind the Municipal
Court was clearly wrong in rejecting the copy of the New Jersey laws. It
might demand expert testimony to explain the statute, had it been complicated
and confused, but it should not have ruled that the only way to prove a
foreign statute was by calling a lawyer of the jurisdiction to testify.
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EVIDENcE-DECLARATION

OF PORTER SFARCIII1G FOR LOST BAGGAGE-RES

GSTAE.--The plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant's sleeping car, placed
his handbag under his berth when he retired for the night. In the morning

itwas missing. He called the porter, who, while searching for it, stated
that, when the Pullman Company let people go through the aisle continually
as they had the previous night, he (the porter) could not be expected to keep
a watch on the passengers. The trial court refused permission of the plaintiff
to testify to what the porter had said. Held: The statement of the porter
The Pullman
isadmissible because itis a part of the res gcstae. Fisher -,.
Co.. 254 S. W. 114 (Mo. 1923).

The scope of the term "res gestae" isexceedingly' vague. Itisused by
the courts in a number of different senses, and the resulting confusion has
-rj.atly embarrassed the leading writers and commentators. 3 Wigmore,
evidence, 735; Bohlen, in 42 A.tiea L. REG. (N. S.) 187; Hunter v. State,
40 N. J. L. 495 (1878). The phrase is used, on the one hand, in allowing
the admission of verbal acts, words which constitute, accompany, or explain
the fact or transaction in issue. Verbal acts, however, are not hearsay, but
are original evidence, offered to prove, not the truth of what was said, but
merely that it was said. 3 WVigmore, Evidence, 776; Lund v. Tyngsborough,
63 'Mass. 36 (i8si). Again, the phrase is used in referring to spontaneous
exclamations, words which are the product of some startling event, such as
an assault, or an accident. Alsever v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co.,
115 Iowa 338, 88 N. W. 841 (i9o2); People v. DelVermo, 192 N. Y. 470.

85 N. E. 69o (19o8). These need not be spoken precisely. at the moment the
event occurs; Waters et al. v. Spokane International Railway Co., 58 Wash.
293, io8 Pac. 593 (i91o); Roach v. Great Northern Railway Co., 133 Minn.
257, 158 N. W. 232 (1916) ; Eby v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 258 Pa. 525.
1o2 Atl. -0 (1917) ; but must be uttered so soon afterwards that the speaker

has had no time to reflect on the effect of what he says. Savannah, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Holland, 82 Ga. 257, io S. E. 2oo (1888); Norwood Trans. Co. v.
Bickell, 2o7 Ala. 232, 92 So. 464 (x922).
There is a third use of the phrase which is unfortunate. Courts employ
it in speaking of admissions of agents which are sought to be introduced
against their principals. But whether or not such an admission should bind
the principal is a matter of agency, depending on whether or not it was
within the scope of the agent's authority to make the statement. According
geslae" is inaccurate.
to the better authority this use of the phrase "'res
Mechem, Agency, 136o; Thayer in 15 A.iER. L. REv. go; Adams Express Co.
v. Berry and WVhitmore Co.. 35 App. D. C. 208; Drinker, Res Gestae in Pennsylvania, 91 (i9o5).

In the principal case, the statement of the porter isnot a verbal act,
because it isoffered to prove the truth of the fact stated. It isnot a
spontaneous exclamation, since it is not the result of an event which would
afford a circumstantial guaranty of its truth. It is admissible under the
third and incorrect use of the phrase, though its admission should be properly placed upon the basis of agency law. It has been held that the statement of an agent of a carrier, mad6 when a shipper demanded his baggage
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of him, vas admissible against his principal because it was within the scope
of his authority. Morse v. Connecticut River R. R. Co., 72 Mass. 450 (1856) ;
Levi & Co. v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co.. 157 Mo. App. 536. 138 S. W. 699
(1911); Prew v. South Dakota Central Ry. Co., 37 S. D. 7z, 156 X. W. 582
(igs6). Similarly, statements made by Pullman porters have been admitted.
Pullman Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. 78 (Pa. 1883); Hampton v. Pullman
Palace Car Co., 42 Mo. App. 134 (i8go); Hill v. Pullman Co., MS8
Fed. 497
(C. C. A. li9u). While the principal case in its decision is in accord with
the weight of authority. it is submitted that the admission of the evidence
as part of the res geslae was contrary to the better reasoned opinions.
.SMt.AcE-AUTOO3LES-SCOP
OF THEFT PoLTcv.-The owner of a
car insured against theft, robbery and pilferage, left it at a garage for repairs. The proprietor took it out for his own purposes, and in returning
struck a telegraph pole damaging the car. Held: This was both common
law and statutory larceny so as to create liability in the insurer. Van Vechten
v...imcrican Eagle Ins. CO.. 2oo N. Y. S. 514 (1923).
Common law larceny cannot be found here since the supposed thief was
a bailee of the car. 17 R. C. L. io; People v. Anderson, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)
294 (1817); see note in 88 A. S. R. 566. Further, there was no attempt to
show an intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property, a necessary
element of the offense. Parr v. Loder, 97 N. Y. App. Div. 218, 89 N. Y. S.
823 (1904) ; Smith v. State. 66 Tex. Cr. 246. 146 S. W. 547 (i912) ; State Y.
Boggs, 18I Ia. 358. 164 X. W. 759 (1917). See also 16 'MIH. L. REV. 260o and
88 A. S. R. 6o6.

Unquestionably the offense was larceny under Section 1293 (a) of the
New York Penal Code. "Any chauffeur or other person who without- the
consent of the owner shall take, use, operate or remove . . . from a
garage, stable or other building . . . an automobile or other vehicle and

operate or drive the same for his own profit, use or purpose, steals the
same and is guilty of larceny."
The case then rests on the meaning of the term "theft" as used in an
insurance policy. In general it is taken as the equivalent of common law
larceny. 8 Words & Phrases 6938; 38 Cyc. 272. Therefore it does not cover
a taking by a bailee: Gunn v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 24 Ga. App.
6x5, xoi S. F_. 691 (1919)- Ledvinka v. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y., 1,39 Md.
434, 115 Ati. 596 (1921); nor a taking without the intent permanently to
deprive the owner of his property. Stuht v. Md. M. C. Ins. Co., go Wash.
576, i56 Pac. 557 (i916); Miller v. Phoenix Ins. Co. of London, 22! IlL
App. 75 (1921); Weir v. Central National Fire Ins. Co., 194 Ia. 446, 189
N. W. 794 (1922).

See Huddy on Automobiles, 5th Ed. (i919)

1o45.

The popular conception of the term "larceny," even though it may be
broader than technical common larceny, hardly goes so far as to include
a mere temporary appropriation; even by construing the policy against the
party drawing it up. it is not easy to find an intent to have the policy include

losses arising from "joy-riding."

Yet this is what one of the three concur-
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ring justices would do, the other two not distinguishing between the common
law and statutory offenses.
In Texas, where larceny under the code includes a taking by a conditional vendee in possession, the insurer has been held liable on a theft policy,
when the facts (lid not constitute common law larceny. Security Ins. Co.
v. Motor Co., 235 S. W. 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). But the decision of the
principal case marks a change in the attitude of the New York Courts. Previously that jurisdiction refused to apply the statutory definition to a policy
where the taking was under a belief of right; Rush v. Boston Ins. Co., 88
Misc. (N. Y.) 48, 15o N. Y. S. 457 (1914), or even where fraud supplied
the necessary intent to bring the case within the common law offense; Delafield v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 164 N. Y. S. 221 (1917) ; a situation in which other states have seen fit to hold the insurer. Hill v. North
River Ins. Co., 111 Kan. 225, 207 Pac. 205 (1922); Illinois Automobile Ins.
Exchange v. Southern Motor Sales Co., 92 So. 429 (Ala. 1922).

NAVIGABLE WATER-RIGHT OF LITTORAL Ow.;rxs.-The plaintiff, a
yacht club, and the defendant, a refinery, owned adjoining properties on a
navigable arm of the sea. The defendant erected a wall across the tidal
flats of his own property, which caused a large amount of sand to be deposited on the plaintiff's beach, thereby rendering plaintiff's pier and boathouse practically useless. The plaintiff sought a decree to prevent the maintenance of the wall. Held: Decree refused. Jubilee* Yacht Club ti. Gulf
Refining Co., 14O N. E. 28o (Mass. 1923).
By the common law rule, followed in many states, the shore between
high and low water marks is the property oi the state. Rex v. Smith, 2
Doug. 441 (Eng. 178o); Brookhaven v. Smith, i88 N. Y. 74, 8o N. E. 665

(19o7) ; Oregon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 52 Oreg. 5o2, 95 Pac. 722, 98

Pac. i6o (x 908). Massachusetts and some other states, however, give the
littoral owner a title in fee to the land as far as low-water mark. Storer
v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (181o); Fast Haven v. Hemingway, 7 Conn. 186
(1828); Hart v. Hill, I Whart. 124 (Pa. 1836). Thus, the wall of the ddfendant extending to a point above low-water mark, was entirely upon land
to which he had title in fee.
The court concludes that the defendant is justified in doing as it pleases
on its own property regardless of possible incidental harm to its neighbors.
This would be correct if the resulting injuries were minor in character and
primarily matters of convenience, as in the cases cited by the court. But
cases arise in which the injury is serious. Van Orsdol v. The B. C. R. &
N. R. Co.. 56 Iowa 470 (1881), (gravel washed upon plaintiff's land) ; Meeker
v. East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623 (19o9), (well pumped dry by unreasonable
use of adjoining well); Heath v. Minneapolis. St. P. & St. M. R. Co., 126
Minn. 470, 148 N. W. 31i

(0914), (sand from fill washed upon plaintiff's

land). That an equitable remedy will be given for threatened failure to
furnish natural support to adjoinin;g property is fundamental. Mears v.
Dole, 135 Mass. 508 (1883) ; Barnes. v. Waterbury, 82 Conn. Sx8. 74 Atl. 902
(19o9) ; Freseman v. Purvis, 5i Pa. Super. 5o6 (1912).
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A riparian owner may protect himself from the cutting of the current

by building dikes- and' walls, but he may not divert the channel so that it
cuts away the land of others. King v. Pagham, 8 Barn. & C. 355 (Eng. 1828) ;
Freeland v. P. R. R. Co., 197 Pa. 529, 47 Atl. 745 (Oyi); Lexington &
See note
Eastern R. R. v. Boatright, 164 Ky. 374, 175 S. W. 648' (iq9iS.

in 6 L R. A. (N. S.), 162. Since the lanfd formed- by gradual accretionbelongs to the abutting owner there have been few cases wllere' objection has
been made to the cause of its formation. 71 U. oF PA. L. Rkv. 157 (1922-23).
But there may well be cases where the formation of land is as objetti6nable
as the destruction of it. In French v. The Connecticut River Ludiber Co.,
145 'Mass. 261, 14 N; E. iiS (1887), where a boom caused a shoal which
blocked, access to the plaintiff's hotel pier, an injunction issued to remove
the boon).
In the principal case the- plaintiff's pier, floats, runways, etc., had to be
extended in order to reach deep water and it has siffffreI "great interference
in the use of its property.' The accession is as haimful and damaging- to
the plaintiff' as an avulsidn would be, and there is no reason why it should
he protected from one and not from the other. Taking the view it does.
the court naturally does not discuss the extent of the change in the channel
or the possible contuance of the deposit, but it seems that the legal remedy
would be inadequate aild that an injunction should issue.

WILLS.-CONSTRCCTION-CO'TINGE.xT WVns.-The testator, before setting

out on a journey, made a will which contained the clause, "this in case that
I meet with accident on this journey

. . . etc."

The testator returned

safely lived tuntil a year later and died wlthout -revoking, the will. Held:
The will was not' contingent and should be probated. Merri an -z. Schiel
el aL, 14o N. E. 6oo (Ohio 1923).

It is owell settled that the validity of a will may depend upon the fulfillment of a condition.. Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. (U. S.)

174 (18353); Damon

v. Damon, 8 Allen, 192 (Mass. 1864). But the intention to make a will conditional must clearly appear from the language employed therein.- Kelleher
v. Kernan, 6o Nid. 44o (1883); Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589 (1885).
The courts look with disfavor upon conditional -wills and are not ilclined
to regard one as such where they can reasonably hold that the testator was
merely expressing his reason for making it at that time. Eaton v. Brown,
103 U. S. 411 (904)

; fit re Forquer's Estate. 216 Pa. 331, 66 Ati. 93 (1907).

The courts will go far in examining the surrounding circumstances of each
case in order to construe away. the condition. See Damon v. Damon, supra.
When the contemplated contingency did not take place the following
expressions were held unconditional: "I am going on a journey and may
never return. If I do not . . ." Eaton v. Brown, supra; "In case of a
. ." Skipwith v. Cabell,
sudden and unexpected death . . . I give
19 Gratt. 758 (Va. i87o) ; "If any accident should happen to me that I die
from home . . ." Likefield v. Likefield. supra: "In case of any serious
accident . . . I direct . . .". In re Tinsley's Will. 187 Iowa 23, 174
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N. W. 4 (1919); but "I am going to town .
. and I aint feeling good
and in case if i shouldend get back do as i say on this paper" was considercd a condition. Morrow's Appeal, iz6 Pa. 440, 9 At. 66o (1887) ; see I re
Iorquer's Estate, supra.
Whi!e the phraseology of the will in the principal case strongly suggests
a condition, the decision reached by the court is in accord with the- usual
interpretation.

